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As a response to the recent global financial crisis, we witnessed a period of unprecedented 
central bank activism. This situation contrasts with what we experienced during the “great 
moderation”. This dramatic change has led many observers to discuss reevaluating the role 
of central banks in the new era. On the one hand, some arguments posit that central banks 
had forgotten a crucial task in their mandate: financial stability. On the other hand, some 
arguments point out that central banks were imprudent for thinking that an adequate 
management of the short run interest rate would suffice for simultaneously promoting 
financial stability and price stability. This document analyses two crucial elements of this 
discussion: the new role for central banking after the recent financial crisis and the 
interaction between price stability and financial stability. I argue that financial fragility 
played a crucial role in explaining the origin of the crisis and that financial fragility was 
related to poor regulation more than to monetary policy. From an ex-post perspective the 
objectives of financial stability and price stability are in general consistent. However, from 
an ex-ante point of view there are occasions in which these two objectives may not be 
totally aligned, which reinforces the need for strengthening and broadening the tools of 




As a response to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, we witnessed a period of 
unprecedented central bank activism. Many central banks, particularly in developed 
economies, implemented diverse policy actions. Central banks around the world 
reduced monetary policy rates to their lower bounds and announced their explicit 
commitment to keep these rates at that level for a prolonged period of time. Some of 
them went further, including the purchasing of private securities, lending to financial 
institutions other than banks and exchange rate interventions.  
 
All these actions contrast with how monetary policy was conducted during the so-called 
“great moderation”, which extended since the mid 1980s. During this period, most 
central banks relied exclusively on short term interest rate management in order to 
achieve their goals. This dramatic change of events has led many observers to argue that 
central banks forgot about a crucial task in their mandates—financial stability—and/or 
they were imprudent for thinking that an adequate management of the short term 
interest rate would suffice to secure price and financial stability at the same time. In 
                                                 
 Keynote speech delivered at the Bank of Korea Internacional Conference 2010, May 31-June 1, Seoul, 
Korea. I am very grateful to Luis F. Céspedes and Kevin Cowan for insightful discussions and 
contributions. 
  1either case, the argument goes, the global financial crisis should lead central banks to 
reevaluate their role in this new era.  
 
There is no doubt that we have the responsibility to carefully assess the recent events. 
We need to do it in order to improve our understanding of the economy and in order to 
improve our macroeconomic policy design, so as to avoid crises, but also handle them 
appropriately. In my view, many of the lessons will not be new, but they draw from 
lessons from previous experiences, but forgotten in academic and policy circles in 
industrialized countries. 
 
I will start my analysis on the new role for central banking after the recent financial 
crisis by discussing the factors that were behind it. Understanding these factors will be 
crucial to analyze if and how the objectives of central banks should be modified and 
potential tradeoffs between competing objectives. Finally, I will discuss the interactions 




What Caused the Financial Crisis? 
 
There are many candidates being pointed out as the culprits of the financial crisis of 
2008-2009. Many have blamed monetary policy. In my opinion, even though monetary 
policy may have played a role, it was a secondary one.
1 The argument blaming 
monetary policy for the current crisis claims that low interest rates combined with large 
current account surpluses in emerging economies, particularly Asian and oil-exporting 
countries, created an abundance of liquidity that triggered excessive increases in asset 
prices (that is, a bubble). This was particularly acute in the housing market. When the 
bubble burst, the crisis erupted. 
 
This argument contends that monetary policy failed to act in a timely fashion and 
allowed severe imbalances to accumulate. Nonetheless, soaring asset prices do not 
necessarily result in a crisis like this one. Moreover, the financial systems of most 
emerging markets proved to be resilient despite significant monetary loosening before 
the crisis. A financial crisis requires the combination of two factors: a surge in the value 
of a set of assets that will eventually collapse, and vulnerability of the financial system 
to the collapse in these assets prices.  
 
In the recent crisis the key assets where houses and structured credit products. The key 
vulnerabilities arose from the exposure of highly leveraged institutions—many of which 
had a substantial maturity mismatch—to these assets. These factors combined led to a 
degree of vulnerability that neither markets nor regulators anticipated. Closer attention 
must therefore be paid to the financial fragility that accompanied this process—both to 
the factors that led to the distortions in asset prices and to the factors that amplified the 
crisis once the adjustment took place. Let me touch briefly on two of these factors: 
 
The first is financial innovation. Despite a lot of public debate and criticism I believe 
that financial innovation is essentially welfare enhancing. However, we must not forget 
that financial innovation can also become a form of circumventing regulation. The way 
                                                 
1 For further discussion on this issue, see De Gregorio (2010). 
  2some securitized assets where used was the clearest case of this abuse. They were 
structured in a way that only secure tranches remained in the balance sheets of banks, 
and the others were sold, many times to off balance vehicles, allowing credit to expand 
with a weak capital base. The result was excess demand for certain securitized assets, 
and excess exposure of highly leveraged intermediaries to these assets. Moving forward, 
financial innovation needs to move in step with regulation to ensure that it adds value 
and is not just a form of evading regulation and aggravating financial fragility. 
 
The second is liquidity transformation. Along with important benefits, liquidity 
transformation entails significant risks. We have known the vulnerabilities of liquidity 
transformation in the presence of aggregate shocks for a long time; in fact, many 
countries paid very dearly for this risk before central banks where set up to provide 
aggregate liquidity. However, in many high income countries central banks had 
centered on regulating and providing liquidity facilities for deposit banks, leaving out 
large fractions of the financial sector that saw substantial developments in non-bank 
liquidity transformation, such as SIVs, money market mutual funds and investment 
banks. When trust in the value of the underlying assets held by these intermediaries 
evaporated, many saw themselves suddenly unable to service their obligations, forcing 
central banks in many countries not only to expand the terms and collateral of liquidity 
provision but also to seek ways to extend liquidity to non-banking agents. 
 
I am not suggesting that the optimal solution is simply to expand the liquidity safety net. 
This would entail serious moral hazard problems. I do think, however, that we need to 
be aware of which agents carry out this role, and consider prudential regulation and ex-
post liquidity provision if they are deemed to be systemic (and if we have the mandate). 
In many emerging market economies (EMEs) we are well aware of the risks of liquidity 
transformation—in particular when it is done in foreign currency. As a precautionary 
tool, most EMEs have built up significant stocks of international reserves. 
 
Nor am I arguing that monetary policy cannot play a role in the creation of bubbles. It 
can, although not so much through the level of the interest rate as through the broad 
monetary policy strategy with which financial turmoil is addressed. I am referring to the 
popularly known Greenspan put. This strategy of relaxing monetary policy once a 
bubble bursts certainly makes the creation of bubbles more likely. But while the mop-up 
strategy worked in some earlier episodes, it failed miserably during the biggest collapse 
in decades. I will return to this point below. 
 
In summary, financial fragility played a crucial role in explaining the origin and 
magnitude of the crisis. But financial fragility was related to poor regulation more than 
monetary policy. Having said this, it can be still argued that the original sin in this case 
was a “relaxation” (loosening) of their financial stability responsibilities by some 
central banks and the inability of the existing supervisory bodies to adequately monitor 
aggregate financial stability.  
 
 
The Objectives of Central Banks 
 
Given the magnitude of the financial crisis we faced, there is always a discussion on 
whether the objectives of central banks were the right ones or if they should be changed. 
As I mentioned before, the financial crisis was mainly related to a poor implementation 
  3of a key task of central banking. Nevertheless, it will be useful for the ensuing 
discussion of the challenges of implementation of central bank tasks to evaluate first 
their current objectives.  
 
Should the objective of price stability be changed? Broadly speaking the answer is no. 
For a start, central banks need to retain a clear mandate for price stability. Inflation is 
costly and should be avoided, and this has to be done by the monetary authority. On this 
issue let me refer briefly to some proposals for increasing the inflation target to avoid 
the possibility of hitting the lower bound of monetary policy and potentially falling into 
a liquidity trap. Our hard won experience indicates that we can have a relatively low 
inflation target (let’s say 2% or 3%) and still be able to deal appropriately with the 
challenges that the lower bound on interest rate imposes. Indeed, there was no emerging 
market that was limited by low inflation to undertake expansionary monetary policy. 
Indeed, the unprecedented monetary loosening in Latin America was possible precisely 
because of the conquest of inflation that took place in the last couple of decades. 
 
The critical issue when interest rates are at their lower bound is the credibility of 
monetary policy. If monetary policy is capable of committing to keep the interest rate 
low for all the time needed to stimulate the economy, the inflation target level issue 
becomes less relevant. Credibility allows for higher levels of flexibility. Flexibility in 
this case includes the set of actions that many central banks implemented in order to 




One extra point regarding the prescription of having a higher inflation target. If the 
proposal for developed economies is having an inflation target of, say, 4%, the inflation 
target for an emerging market economy should presumably be somewhat higher, given 
the larger shocks that affect them. But with an inflation target of 4% or even more, we 
cannot exclude that mechanisms that automatically recover purchasing power are going 
to be developed. It is not difficult to picture a scenario in which we could end up having 
more wage inertia due to indexation. In addition, inflationary expectations could 
become more volatile. This, in turn, will significantly reduce the gains of having a 
higher inflation target in the first place. 
 
A credible commitment to stable inflation also generates greater stability of the business 
cycle, allowing less costly unemployment fluctuations. Indeed, a reason for the great 
moderation the global economy experienced for an extended period of time was in part 
due to a better management of monetary policy and not only to good luck.
3 Therefore, a 
credible commitment to price stability increases welfare by reducing both, inflation and 
unemployment volatility. 
 
Despite the big consensus regarding the need to preserve price stability as a central goal 
of monetary policy, some analysts have argued that such a concept should be expanded 
to include asset prices. By allowing significant deviations of asset prices from their 
“fundamentals”, central banks planted the seeds of financial crisis. Therefore, it has 
been argued that monetary policy should respond to asset prices. I think this approach is 
too narrow. As I already mentioned, the financial crisis was not only related to the burst 
                                                 
2 For expositions of monetary policy implementation at the lower bound, see Bernanke and Reinhart 
(2007), Bernanke (2009) and Murray (2009).  
3 For evidence in the U.S., see Galí and Gambetti (2009) and for emerging markets, De Gregorio (2008). 
  4in asset prices but mainly to its interaction with financial fragility. Asset price bubbles 
and financial fragility are part of a more complete (and complex) concept: financial 
stability. Dealing with an asset price bubble with monetary policy is not that simple. 
 
This view is particularly problematic in small open economies. The increase in 
valuation of asset prices in these economies is usually the result of a large exchange rate 
appreciation coupled with large capital inflows. Attempting to stabilize asset prices with 
monetary policy could be counterproductive, since an increase in interest rates to 
contain the rise in asset prices could induce greater inflows and carry trade operations 
that might end up appreciating the currency even further. 
 
As to the role of central banks in financial stability, the change should come not in the 
need to have this mandate but in how we define it and the priority given to it. We must 
bear in mind that central banks have played a historical role in the stability of deposit 
taking banks. However, the current crisis shows that we need to carefully revise this 
narrow definition of financial stability, or at the very least recognize that it is impossible 
to safeguard deposit taking banks without ensuring the adequate functioning of other 
key markets or financial intermediaries.  
 
Defining and monitoring “financial stability” is a difficult task. Central banks have been 
carrying out significant efforts in order to improve the monitoring of the financial sector 
in the form of financial stability reports. Based on our recent experience we know that 
close monitoring of asset prices, credit flows and the current account deficit is required. 
Moreover, substantial work also needs to be done in monitoring the vulnerabilities of 
both bank and non bank agents—including financial intermediaries, firms and 
households. Finally, understanding interconnections in the financial system—be they 
via balance sheets, asset markets or risk perceptions—is also a key component of 
financial stability monitoring. The challenges in doing all of this are both conceptual 
and practical, as we often rely on a statistical toolbox best aimed at capturing 
macroeconomic trends and less suited for the analysis of the whole distribution and, in 
particular, tails risks, which are crucial for financial stability analysis. 
 
Although most central banks have an explicit financial stability objective, for some of 
them it was a secondary issue for many years, as GDP was growing strong and banks 
and firms displayed sound balance sheets. Now things have changed dramatically. As of 
last year, financial stability became the key factor driving monetary policy management 
in developed countries. It should remain at the same level of priority as price stability in 
the future to avoid a repetition of recent events.  
 
 
The Interaction between Price Stability and Financial Stability 
 
I think that probably the main challenge that emerges from the recent crisis is in the 
conduct of policies by central banks—and in particular in the interaction between the 
two key objectives I mentioned above, price stability (PS) and financial stability (FS). 
 
Let me begin by discussing the interaction between financial and price stability in 
normal times, that is, before an event leading to a period of financial turmoil like the 
one we witnessed in late 2008. 
 
  5In many cases there is no conflict between setting short term interest rates to pursue 
financial stability and price stability. For example, faced by a change in future income 
perception that leads to higher consumption, debt levels and rising inflation, rising rates 
will be conducive to both PS and FS. 
 
In several other cases, however, the optimal short term policy decision for FS and PS 
conflict and additional tools are required. I will argue that these cases fall into two broad 
categories. 
 
The first is when the monetary policy framework itself can amplify financial 
vulnerabilities. Financial agents take the distributions of asset prices into account when 
determining their risk exposure, and as such, they adjust their portfolios according to the 
policy framework. The problem arises because policies cannot always bring stability 
when faced with unusual shocks, which may even require changes in the policy regime. 
There are some important examples of this. 
 
One example is currency mismatches. In the 1980s and 1990s, many emerging markets 
put in place exchange rate systems that limited or altogether eliminated perceived 
foreign exchange rate risk. The objective was, in most cases, to reduce inflation. And in 
many cases the success was remarkable on this front. However, not surprisingly, firms, 
households and financial intermediaries were reluctant to hedge currency risk in this 
setting—accumulating liabilities in foreign currencies to finance assets in local 
currencies. When an external shock, or an increasing exchange rate misalignment, 
forced the countries to abandon the peg, the value of debts skyrocketed leading to very 
severe financial crises, as in Chile 1982 or Argentina 2002. Indeed, in these cases there 
is also a moral hazard issue, since currency mismatches tend to be exacerbated under 
the promise that the exchange rate will remain fixed, and if changes occur, the authority 
will have to bail out those who believed in their commitment.  
 
The popularly known Greenspan put, is another example. This strategy of relaxing 
monetary policy once a bubble has burst—although fully consistent with price 
stability—encourages risk taking by financial intermediaries, firms and households. As 
the burst of the housing bubble showed, this strategy is not always advisable. 
 
An additional example of the role of central bank policies on risk taking is the “great 
moderation” itself. There is an interesting stylized fact across banks in different 
countries. In countries where GDP is more volatile, bank leverage is lower, and banks 
(by either choice or regulation) put more capital aside to deal with uncertainty.
4 This 
being the case, it is not hard to imagine that a period of declining volatility in prices and 
output leads to increased risk taking across several economies. 
 
By stating this, I am not suggesting that we should aim at higher volatility. However, 
we need to recognize the impact that price stability has on financial vulnerabilities 
(financial fragility), and adjust financial regulation accordingly. 
 
Let me now turn to a second source of conflict between interest rate policies that target 
PS and FS: an innovation that simultaneously leads to increased aggregate demand 
                                                 
4 Chapter V, Financial Stability Report 1st half 2009, Central Bank of Chile. 
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  6becoming a risk for FS that coincides with a positive aggregate supply shock. Two 
examples come to mind. The first is the current concern regarding capital inflows and 
financial stability. Many have argued—rightly, I think—that large capital inflows could 
simultaneously lead to increasing financial vulnerabilities without posing an inflationary 
problem because of the appreciation of the local currency. The correct reaction for PS—
keeping loose monetary conditions—is not necessarily the correct reaction from an FS 
standpoint. The second is the build up to the global financial crisis in the US and 
Europe. One of the reasons that monetary policy did not react to rising household debt, 
was that global supply factors had been contributing to drive prices down. 
 
Central banks need to oversee price stability and financial stability. One instrument 
(namely, the interest rate) is often not enough for pursuing two objectives. More 
generally, the two objectives should be addressed with more than one instrument. The 
choice of instrument will depend on both the cause of the financial fragility and the 
institutional setting of each country. For a start, central banks should work closely with 
“micro-prudential” supervisors, communicating potential risks so that these can be 
incorporated into the supervision process or into changes in regulation. A regional 
house bubble would be a good example of this kind of coordination, with supervisors 
adjusting provisions accordingly. In addition, central banks should consider macro-
prudential regulation that adjusts capital, liquidity or asset quality regulation through the 
cycle or in periods of higher risk taking.  
 
Finally, central banks should not discard using their balance sheet to “correct” the prices 
of financial assets when these asset prices are leading to increased vulnerabilities in the 
financial system. In EMEs this is typically the case of a boom where there are signs that 
the currency may be strengthening beyond its fundamentals, in which case a mechanism 
of self-insurance, such as accumulation of reserves, may help to smooth the transition 
and to have the economy well-prepared for potential reversals of capital flows. In the 
case of Chile, we have intervened three times in the exchange rate market since the 
currency was allowed to float in 1999. In the first two cases (2001 and 2002) events in 
international financial markets led to rapid depreciations, unrelated to country 
fundamentals. In the last case—2008—we considered it prudent to build up reserves in 
a period in which the exchange rate was below fundamentals and global financial 
markets were under extreme stress. 
 
Let me now refer to the interaction between financial and price stability from an ex-post 
perspective, i.e. once a financial shock (crisis) has hit the economy. From an ex-ante 
point of view I discussed that there are occasions in which these two objectives may not 
be completely aligned. From an ex-post perspective, these objectives are in general 
consistent, which will reinforce the need for strengthening the ex-ante dimension of 
financial stability. 
 
Suppose that a shock in financial markets (of a domestic or external nature; based on 
fundamentals or simple contagion) hits the economy. This shock will result in an 
increase in the cost of capital, bringing down investment and aggregate demand. The 
reduction in aggregate demand reduces output and therefore also reduces inflationary 
pressures. This example shows that dealing with this “financial shock” is usually—and I 
will be explicit regarding this conditionality—consistent with pursuing price and output 
stability. From this ex-post perspective, financial and price stability can be addressed 
simultaneously.  
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The instruments that monetary policy can use to deal with these financial shocks will 
depend on the nature of the financial shock. The dose will depend on the initial 
conditions of the economy and the magnitude of the shock. A simple example is dealing 
with uncertainty in financial markets that increases demand for liquidity, which requires 
the provision of liquidity by the central bank. Is this consistent with price stability? Yes, 
indeed. If the financial shock consists of a collapse in asset prices that weakens balance 
sheets and leads to further declines in asset prices, the economic contraction can be 
substantial. The monetary policy response in this case will be to reduce interest rates, 
consistently with price stability (as in Bernanke and Gertler, 1999).  
 
In the aforementioned cases, policy interventions under financial stress, either lender of 
last resort (liquidity injections) or interest rate types, are consistent with PS and FS. But 
it may be the case that the magnitude of the financial shock is so severe than neither 
price nor financial stability may be fulfilled. The problem is not that these two 
objectives are mutually inconsistent, but that the shock is too large to be addressed with 
the standard tools. Nevertheless, the fact that the targets may not be achieved within the 
“policy horizon” does not mean that monetary policy cannot be effective to reduce the 
costs of the crisis. If something, output costs associated to the global financial crisis 
have been, so far, significantly lower than the ones we observed in previous comparable 
episodes. Macroeconomic policy has a lot to do with this. Let me now refer to what I 
call a new set of instruments and their consequences for monetary policy.  
 
So far I have assumed that dealing with financial stress involves only “traditional” 
instruments. But if financial stress is too severe, some unconventional actions may be in 
order. In particular, if financial stress damages financial intermediation substantially, 
the channels through which “traditional” policy responses operate will be shut down. 
This is a “financial crisis”: a severe disruption of intermediation in financial markets.  
 
The policy response in this case is going to depend crucially on the type of financial 
market we are operating in. During the recent financial crisis, we saw direct 
interventions of some central banks in financial markets. This direct policy intervention 
has been called credit policy. Given that financial intermediation is severely impaired, 
central banks have stepped in to replace private financial intermediaries. In this way, 
central banks avoid a collapse of the economy and the self-reinforcing forces of 
deflationary spirals. In economies where banks are the most important financial 
intermediaries, credit policy may be less effective. That may be the reason why in some 
emerging market economies, state-owned banks apparently played an important role in 
mitigating the recent crisis. And also why in the past, a common policy action following 
a financial crisis was to intervene private banks. 
 
Coming back to credit policy, this policy has resulted in a significant increase in the 
balance sheets of central banks necessary to finance those operations. This increase in 
the balance sheets of central banks (reserves) has been pointed out as a source of 
inconsistency with future price stability. Increasing interest rates to secure price stability 
in the future will require undoing those operations, which could threaten financial 
stability. But central banks that are facing this challenge have an instrument that may be 
very useful in this situation: they have the ability to pay an interest rate on those 
reserves different from the monetary policy rate. This additional instrument should be 
enough to secure a smooth exit from their current situation without affecting price 
  8stability (see Cúrdia and Woodford, 2010). Again, price stability and ex-post financial 
stability are mutually consistent.  
 
Nevertheless, some analysts have argued that if some unconventional policy 
interventions have been too extended, price and financial stability may not be consistent 
from an intertemporal perspective. In effect, some dimensions of unconventional 
monetary policy, in particular credit policy, involve a fiscal dimension. It has been 
argued that those fiscal aspects are likely to threaten monetary policy independence and 
therefore jeopardize price stability (Goodfriend, 2010). Although these concerns are 
relevant, I think that the key solution to them will be strengthening independence of 
central banks and generating a more resilient financial system as discussed before.   
 
Let me conclude by addressing the conditionality statement that I made regarding 
dealing with financial shocks and price stability a while back. In the past, some 
emerging market economies were incapable of implementing countercyclical monetary 
policy. The reason was that a countercyclical policy implied a depreciation of the 
exchange rate, which was perceived as destabilizing. In effect, if liabilities are 
denominated in a foreign currency due to some ex-ante inflexibility in the exchange 
rate, and if the exchange rate pass-through is high due to poor credibility of monetary 
policy, a depreciation of the exchange rate increases inflation and reduces output. How 
vulnerable the economy is (in terms of a currency mismatches and exchange rate pass-
through in this example) will make a big difference in terms of the policy response. In a 
similar vein, ex-ante financial stability is crucial to reduce the vulnerability of the 





The world economy enjoyed a prolonged period of stability—with significant 
associated benefits—until the global financial crisis erupted. While it lasted, growth was 
high and stable, and inflation was low. However, this period of stability also encouraged 
financial markets to engage in an excessive search for yield without proper risk 
management.  Such periods, where the job of monetary policy becomes easier, pose an 
important challenge to policymakers, regulators and the private sector to carefully 
monitor the build up of financial vulnerabilities. 
 
In emerging markets we have lived through periods of bonanza that have led to severe 
imbalances that eventually culminated in costly crises and economic adjustment. Now it 
was the turn of industrial countries. We have learned the lessons, and our challenge now 
is to restore prosperity with more resilient financial systems. Central banks have an 
important role in this endeavor. 
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